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NONE FOR THE ROAD: ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF
UNINSURED VEHICLES AND DRIVERS IN ARKANSAS
Philip D. Oliver"
I. INTRODUCTION
The legislatures of all states have enacted statutes whose goal is to assure,
by varying means, that owners and drivers of vehicles will be able to respond
in damages in case of accidents for which they are legally responsible.' Most
states require liability insurance for all vehicles.2 Subject to certain exceptions,
Arkansas does so as well.3
Effective enforcement of compulsory insurance laws has proved to be
difficult. Nationwide,4 and in Arkansas, a large percentage of vehicles on the
road are operated in violation of financial responsibility statutes. This article
* Altheimer Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock;
Visiting Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. J.D., Yale University Law School; B.A.,
University of Alabama. I appreciate the support of the administrations and library staffs of both
UALR and Wake Forest. Valuable research assistance was provided by UALR law students
Jason Stuart and Margot Barg, and by Wake Forest law student Danielle Salgat.
This article arose from my work with the Arkansas Bar Association Committee on Tort
Law. Arising from its charge to "study . . . laws relating to personal injury . . . [and
recommend] actions to promote justice," the Committee is concerned about the problem
addressed in the article. The views expressed, however, are my own, and not necessarily those
of the Committee. (In particular, I strongly suspect that my comments concerning significant
modification of the tort system applicable to traffic accidents, infra at notes 68-89 and
accompanying text, are not consistent with the Committee's views.)
1. The statutes can be divided into two principal types--compulsory insurance statutes
and financial security statutes. "The difference between compulsory and 'security-type'
insurance is that 'security-type' insurance requires security only after an accident has occurred,
or where the operator is classified as a 'habitual offender."' Thomas C. Cady & Christy Hardin
Smith, West Virginia's Automobile Insurance Policy Laws: A Practitioner's Guide, 97 W. VA.
L. REV. 583, 589 (1995).
2. Classification of particular statutes can vary. Professor Cady and Ms. Smith stated
in 1995 that 26 states "make automobile liability insurance compulsory." See id. at 591 n.30.
The following year, a student commentator classified 40 states and the District of Columbia as
having "enacted compulsory automobile insurance statutes," and two more as having "some
compulsory liability features." See Joel P. Williams, Note, Insurance Law--Protecting the
Public Under Maryland's Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Scheme: The Abrogation of
an Insurer's Common-Law Right to Void an Insurance Contract Ab Initio for a Material
Misrepresentation in the Policy Application, 25 U. BALT. L. REV. 289, 296-97 n.53 (1996).
Arkansas, which is omitted from the Cody & Smith list, but included in the Williams
note, demonstrates the problem of classification. Arkansas requires liability insurance, but
allows for certificates of self-insurance in relatively narrow circumstances. See infra notes 14-
17 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
4. The problem is by no means unique to Arkansas. For example, the California
Legislature found in 1996 that at least 28 percent of vehicles are in violation of that state's
financial security laws. See 1996 CA. STAT. (1)(C).
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examines the effectiveness of current Arkansas law, and considers alternatives.
While the primary goal is to recommend appropriate measures for the State of
Arkansas, extensive reference will be made to the laws and experiences of
other states.
Certain measures could be taken that would improve the rate of compli-
ance in Arkansas. However, it appears likely that effective enforcement will
be difficult under any legal regime likely to command public and political
support. The final portion of this article briefly considers significant departures
from current tort law, which, unfortunately, are also unlikely to be enacted.
11. THE HYBRID NATURE OF THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY INSURANCE
An insurance policy is a contract. Normally, the decision to enter into a
contract is voluntary, and therefore each contracting party must think that the
benefits he5 will receive from the contract exceed the costs of fulfilling it. Most
insurance policies-termed "first-party" insurance-provide that in the case of
an insured loss, some form of payment will be made either to the insured or to
a beneficiary closely identified with the insured, such as a family member.
Examples of first-party insurance include life, disability, health, accident, and
fire insurance.
Certain common forms of insurance on vehicles are first-party insurance.
Collision insurance protects against damage to one's own vehicle in an
accident. Comprehensive insurance provides protection against damage to or
loss of the vehicle resulting from causes such as theft and Acts of God. One
form of first-party insurance--uninsured motorist coverage 6-- is of particular
relevance, and is discussed in some detail below.
7
Most first-party insurance policies provide some indirect benefit to society
at large, or to members of society other than the insured and his family. For
example, health insurance benefits health care providers and society in general
by providing a source of payment for services that are likely to be provided
either free of charge or at public expense to an individual who lacks both assets
and insurance. Similarly, life insurance reduces the likelihood of a family
going on welfare after the death of a breadwinner. Society encourages both
forms of insurance by such means as providing favorable tax treatment.8 Fire
5. Due to the inadequacies of the English language, I have used masculine pronouns to
indicate individuals of indefinite sex.
6. Uninsured motorist coverage applies when the insured is harmed by the negligence
of another motorist who does not have third-party liability insurance.
7. See infra notes 61-62, 65-67, and accompanying text.
8. For example, the Internal Revenue Code excludes from employees' income the value
of most employer-provided health and life insurance, notwithstanding a general rule that fringe
benefits are to be included in income. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 61(a)(l), 79, 106 (1998).
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insurance protects a homeowner against loss of his home, but it also protects
his lender's collateral. For this reason, the mortgagee usually requires that the
borrower maintain insurance. 9
In general, however, society is content to leave decisions about first-party
insurance to each individual, as is the case with most economic decisions in a
free market system. The owner of a vehicle is entirely free, for example, either
to insure against theft or to bear the risk of theft and save the premium. The
basic tenet of capitalism, after all, is that societal wellbeing is maximized by
each individual pursuing his own benefit-Adam Smith's "invisible hand" at
work.' 0
Liability insurance, however, is fundamentally different. Such coverage
is referred to as "third-party" insurance. While the policy is a contract between
the insured and the insurance company, it provides for possible payments to an
unrelated and unknown third party--the victim of the insured's negligence. To
be sure, liability insurance also provides valuable protection for the
insured--protection against being held personally liable and against the
burdens of securing and paying an attorney to defend the case, if necessary.
However, the benefit to the third party may significantly outweigh the benefit
to the insured. This is particularly true if the insured has little to lose,
materially. If the insured is "judgment proof," apart from insurance, the benefit
of third-party liability insurance inures almost entirely to the third party. In this
situation, normal operation of the market would lead many rational motorists
to conclude that the benefit of third-party liability insurance to them--and they
are the ones footing the bill-is not worth its cost. Unfortunately, this rational,
though unlawful, decision against third-party insurance is made tens of
thousands of times each year in Arkansas, and millions of times across the
nation.
9. Most mortgagees place so much importance on the maintenance of insurance that they
remit the premium payments themselves, rather than relying on a contractual undertaking by
the mortgagor to do so. Typically, the mortgagee collects each month from the mortgagor an
amount adequate to cover insurance and real estate taxes, holds these sums in escrow, and
makes payments when due.
10. Smith states:
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can . . . to direct that
industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily
labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally,
indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest nor knows how much he is
promoting it.... [B]y directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may
be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423
(Edwin Cannon ed., Random House 1937) (1776).
1999]
UALR LAW REVIEW
Compulsory responsibility laws reflect an unwillingness to allow
motorists focused on their own interest to decide against protecting third
parties. Societal interest in the protection of accident victims has been
sufficient to lead Arkansas, like other states, to require third-party liability
insurance or some alternative form of financial responsibility.
Im. PRESENT ARKANSAS LAW REGARDING
THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. Required Insurance
Liability insurance is mandatory for the overwhelming majority of
Arkansas vehicles. Subject to special rules for certain commercial vehicles,"
the policy must provide coverage of "25-50-15"--$25,000 for injury or death
of a single person, $50,000 for injury or death of more than one person in a
single accident, and $15,000 for damage to property. 2 Motorists may contract
for higher policy limits if they wish, but any such excess is not subject to the
extensive statutory structure applicable to the minimum coverage.'
3
A narrow exception to the requirement of third-party liability insurance
is available to individuals and entities who obtain a certificate of self-
insurance. 4 This certificate can be sought by only three categories of vehicle
owners--municipalities and subdivisions of the state, 15 owners of at least
twenty-five Arkansas vehicles, and individuals whose religion prohibits the
11. The variations may call for either higher or lower limits. For example, businesses that
move manufactured homes must maintain 100-300-100 coverage, which is much higher than
normal. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-35-301(3), 27-35-305(a) (Michie 1994). On the other
hand, taxicabs need maintain coverage of only 25-50-10, which is lower coverage for property
damage than normal. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-14-1501 (Michie 1997). Municipalities can
set higher limits for taxicabs in some cases, however. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-14-1501(g)(1)
(Michie 1997).
12. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-104(b) (Michie 1997).
13. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-19-713(g) (Michie 1994).
14. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-104(a)(1) (Michie 1997).
15. As a general rule, political subdivisions of the state are immune from liability "except
to the extent that they may be covered by liability insurance." See ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-301
(Michie 1996). However, political subdivisions must either maintain insurance or "become
self-insurers," presumably by obtaining a certificate of self-insurance. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 21-9-303(a) (Michie 1996). Liability is limited to the minimum limits of required liability
insurance, unless the political subdivision chooses to carry a policy (or participate in a self-
insurance pool) with higher limits. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-303(b) (Michie 1996).
Unfortunately, political subdivisions of the state, like individuals, sometimes violate the
state's financial responsibility laws. In such a case, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that,
notwithstanding sovereign immunity, the political unit is liable to the extent of minimum
required coverage. See Sturdivant v. Farmington, 255 Ark. 415, 500 S.W.2d 769 (1973).
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purchase of all insurance. 16 Upon application, the Office of Motor Vehicle
"may, in its discretion" issue a certificate of self-insurance if satisfied that the
applicant "is possessed and will continue to be possessed of ability to pay"
adverse judgments.' 7
It is clear that issuance of certificates of self-insurance does not undercut
the ability of accident victims to recover damages. Entities that own twenty-
five vehicles and governmental units can be expected to have financial
resources exceeding the required minimums for insurance coverage. The
narrow religious exemption affects very few vehicles, and even there, the
Office of Motor Vehicle is empowered to condition the exemption on a
showing of financial wherewithal. The problem is not motorists who are
exempt from the insurance requirement, but those who disregard it. Subse-
quent discussion will generally ignore certificates of self-insurance, and simply
refer to compulsory liability insurance.
B. Enforcement of the Insurance Requirement
The Arkansas General Assembly attempts to assure compliance with its
insurance requirements through a variety of statutes. These may be divided
into three categories: registration, traditional traffic law enforcement, and
information gathering.
1. Registration
The best known enforcement provision, and the most important, is that
proof of minimum insurance is required in order to obtain license tags, both
initially and at annual renewals.' Effective in 1998, this verification will
normally be effected by a computerized review of the Vehicle Insurance
Database conducted by personnel of the Department of Finance and Adminis-
tration (DFA).19 Although the primary purpose of this change may have been
to simplify the renewal process for motorists, it seems likely to lead to more
efficient and accurate determinations concerning coverage.
16. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-19-107(a) (Michie 1994).
The religious exemption is dependent upon membership in a denomination which
"prohibits its members from purchasing insurance of any form as being contrary to its religious
tenets," Individual objection does not satisfy the terms of the statute, nor does a denomination's
objection only to automobile liability insurance. Presumably these limitations are designed to
assure that the exception is limited to those whose religious objection to insurance is bona fide.
Apparently the limitations have never been challenged in court.
17. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-19-107(b) (Michie 1994).
18. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-13-102(a) (Michie Supp. 1997).
19. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-13-102(b) (Michie Supp. 1997).
1999]
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2. Traditional Traffic Law Enforcement
Apart from proof of insurance at registration, the primary means of
enforcing compliance with compulsory insurance laws is essentially the same
as that for most traffic offenses. Law enforcement personnel, incident to
stopping a motorist for another violation or at a checkpoint, or while investigat-
ing an accident, can cite a motorist for violation of compulsory insurance laws
along with any other violations. By statute, the motorist's failure to present
proof of insurance coverage coupled with the absence of insurance information
in the computerized Vehicle Insurance Database creates a rebuttable presump-
tion that the vehicle is uninsured.20 In such case, the officer is "to remove and
impound" the vehicle's tag.2' And, "in addition to any traffic citation issued
for violation of this section," the officer is to issue the motorist a notice of
noncompliance with the compulsory insurance statute, and send a copy of the
notice to DFA. In order to have the registration reinstated and the tag reissued,
the motorist must provide proof of insurance and pay a reinstatement fee of
$20.22
The primary penalties for violation of the mandatory insurance provisions
are graduated fines, but include the possibility of incarceration for a repeat
offender. The first offense is punishable by a fine of $50 to $250; the second
by a fine of $250 to $500; and the third and subsequent offenses by a fine of
$500 to $1000, or up to one year in jail, or both.23 Interestingly, the statute
provides that the minimum fines are "mandatory" for the first and second
offenses, but is silent concerning the judge's discretion to suspend the sentence
for a third or subsequent violation.24 One might have expected that the General
20. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-104(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 1997).
21. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-104(c)(3)(A) (Michie Supp. 1997). The tag "shall be
returned" either to the Office of Driver Services of DFA or to the local revenue office. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-104(c)(3)(B) (Michie Supp. 1997).
22. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-104(g)(1) (Michie Supp. 1997).
23. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-103(a)-(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 1997).
24. See id. In another curious twist, the General Assembly provides that the judge "may"
dismiss the charge and impose no penalty "[u]pon a showing that [required] liability coverage
... was in effect at the time of arrest." See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-103(b)(3) (Michie Supp.
1997). The suggestion that the judge might have discretion not to dismiss the charges is
surprising, because if insurance were in effect, the statute would not have been violated. On
the contrary, surely it is the state's burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the absence of
such coverage. The state may or may not be aided in discharging its burden by ARK. CODE
ANN. § 27-22-104(a)(2), discussed supra in text accompanying note 20. That section provides
that a "rebuttable presumption" of noncompliance arises if the motorist fails to prevent proof
of insurance "at the time of arrest" and the Vehicle Insurance Database does not show coverage
"at the time of the traffic stop." Whether the rebuttable presumption is applicable only for
purposes of arrest, and not of ultimate conviction, is open to question. The statutory language
"at the time of arrest," and "at the time of the traffic stop," however indicative of violation at
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Assembly would be more likely to have insisted on mandatory sentencing of
repeat violators.
If the uninsured vehicle is involved in an accident, the consequences are
somewhat more severe. The operator is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, 
2
and, upon conviction, the court may order the vehicle impounded until proof
of insurance is provided.16 Moreover, the owner and driver of an uninsured
vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury, death, or property damage
of $500 or more are subject to a statutory regime designed to protect an injured
party's possible claim against the owner or driver.27
the time of arrest, is surely not the proper measure to create a presumption at the time of trial.
At trial, it might seem reasonable to allow the state a rebuttable presumption if at that time-at
trial-neither the motorist's written evidence nor the Vehicle Insurance Database indicated that
the vehicle was insured. However, the statute refers only to the time of the traffic stop and
arrest, and basing a presumption at trial on the state of evidence at an earlier time seems
questionable.
In the form in which the 1997 legislation was initially proposed, failure to maintain proof
of insurance in the vehicle at all times would have been an offense separate from the failure to
maintain insurance. See Ark. H.R. 81-1156, §§ 1-2 (1997). Violation would have resulted in
a fine of $25 to $50, which the judge was not to dismiss upon a showing that insurance had, in
fact, been in force. See Ark. H.R. 81-1156, § 1 (1997). These provisions were not included in
the final act, however.
25. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-105(a) (Michie Supp. 1997). The maximum penalties
for a Class A misdemeanor are a fine of $1,000 and incarceration of one year. See ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-4-201(b)(1), -401(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1997).
26. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-105(b) (Michie Supp. 1997).
27. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-19-601 to -621 (Michie 1994). Among the several
exceptions to the security requirement is the motorist's having a liability policy, or a certificate
of self-insurance, in effect at the time of the accident. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-19-604(1),
(4) (Michie 1994). The required deposit tracks the 25-50-15 coverage that should have been
in effect-in case of an accident involving injury or death of one person, security of $25,000
is required; for injury or death of two or more persons, the requirement is $50,000; and for
property damage, $15,000 is required. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-19-603(a)(1)(A)-(C) (Michie
1994). If, as is very likely in any accident resulting in bodily harm, the accident resulted in both
bodily harm and property damage, the requirement is "a combination of the amounts specified
in subdivisions (a)(1)(A)-(C)." See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-19-603(a)(1)(D) (Michie 1994).
If it is clear that there is no liability, the bond is not required in the first instance. For
example, if an uninsured vehicle were lawfully parked at the time of the accident, no security
would be required. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-19-604(6) (Michie 1994). Similarly, the owner
of an uninsured vehicle is not required to post security if the vehicle were being used by another
without the owner's permission. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-19-604(7) (Michie 1994). Once
the other person releases the driver or owner from liability, the security requirement ends. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-19-613(a) (Michie 1994).
These provisions are not primarily directed at assuring that vehicles are properly insured,





Certain Arkansas statutes are designed to ensure that the state will be
notified when a liability policy lapses. First, termination of coverage is
ineffective unless the Office of Driver Services is given ten days' notice.2
Absent such notice, this statute keeps the policy in force even after the
policyholder has ceased paying premiums with the knowledge that payment is
due and that nonpayment will result in termination of coverage.29
Effective in 1998, the notification process has been greatly expanded.
Every insurer is required to report on a monthly basis, in a computerized
form,3" detailed information about its policies insuring Arkansas motorists,
including effective and expiration dates.
3'
The same 1997 legislation that mandated increased reporting by insurers
also established the Vehicle Insurance Database 2.3  DFA is directed to release
information from the database to state and local law enforcement agencies.
33
28. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-19-714(a), -209 (Michie 1994).
29. In such a case, notification of the Office of Driver Services would appear to serve the
function of alerting the state to the termination of coverage so that the state can (in theory)
intervene to prevent the vehicle from being operated without proper coverage. This provision
seems to be designed almost entirely for the protection of the third-party victim of the insured,
and not of the insured himself. Logically, therefore, the company's failure to notify should
keep the policy in force only for the benefit of the third party, and not for the benefit of the
insured. By this reasoning, the company could not deny coverage to the third party, but could
sue the former policyholder for indemnity. As the Georgia Court of Appeals observed, the
effect of the policy and statute is to "leave the [policy] in effect for the protection of the public
and not for the protection of the insured." Garden City Cab Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 80
Ga. App. 850, 853, 57 S.E.2d 683, 685 (1950). The Arkansas statutory provision includes no
such limitation, however, and there appears to be no Arkansas case on point.
30. The insurance department may, by regulation, exempt "a small or low-volume insurer"
from the requirement of "electronic or electro-magnetic" reporting. Reports in some other form
would still be required. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-107(a) (Michie Supp. 1997).
31. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-107 (Michie Supp. 1997).
32. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-14-414 (Michie Supp. 1997).
33. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-14-414(e)(1)(C) (Michie 1994). In general, information
in the database is closely held. Apart from the insured and, if the insured is a minor, his parents,
information in the database is to be disclosed only to law enforcement agencies, the Arkansas
Crime Information Center, and to "other government offices upon showing of need." See id.
The information is explicitly exempted from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). See id. at § 27-14-414(e)(2).
The wisdom of this broad confidentiality is debatable. The information seems less
sensitive than much that is subject to FOIA disclosure. I can see that the amount of coverage
might be confidential, as an indication of financial position. And I can see that the company
with which the motorist does business should perhaps not be subject to disclosure, due to
unwanted marketing approaches by-competing insurance companies.
The naked fact that a motorist is or is not in compliance with state law, however, should
likely be a matter of public record. Publicity of noncompliance, perhaps by newspapers, might
encourage maintenance of insurance. Facilitating marketing to uninsured motorists by
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IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT LAW
The next step is to consider the effectiveness of the laws currently on the
books. This evaluation takes two forms. First is the empirical question of the
extent to which motorists comply with the insurance requirement. Second is
the examination of existing statutes for inherent weaknesses.
A. Extent of Noncompliance
It is unknown, and unknowable with data currently available, how many
uninsured vehicles are being operated in Arkansas. Uninsured vehicles can be
divided into two categories-vehicles that are registered but not insured, and
vehicles that are neither registered nor insured. Although we now have solid
information about the former category, we remain ignorant about the latter.
As noted above, effective January 1, 1998 insurers began reporting
comprehensive information about their policies in force. 34  Based on a
comparison of the data submitted by insurers and the state's records of
registered vehicles, it appears that approximately seventeen percent of vehicles
registered in Arkansas are not insured.35 At the present time, there is no means
of ascertaining the number of vehicles that are neither registered nor insured.
While one can view the glass as half full rather than half empty--most vehicles
are properly insured, and some officials had suspected that the figures would
show that more than seventeen percent of registered vehicles were
uninsured36-- unquestionably, a large number of uninsured vehicles are being
driven in Arkansas.
B. Evaluation of Present Enforcement Provisions
1. Insurance as Precondition of Registration
It seems likely that the requirement of insurance at registration is the most
effective measure in place. At first blush, an accurate review of insurance
coverage in connection with issuance of tags might seem sufficient in itself to
take care of the problem. However, there are two wide avenues of avoidance.
insurance companies and their agents is a development that should be welcomed, not restricted.
34. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-107 (Michie 1994), discussed supra in notes 30-31 and
accompanying text.
35. See Telephone Interview with Donald R. Melton, Liaison to the Governor for Local




First, while tags are renewed annually, insurance policies typically run for
shorter periods, frequently six months. Moreover, the policy may be
terminated before the end of the term of the policy for nonpayment of
premiums.37 If, for example, the insured paid only the first month's premium
in order to renew his tags, then the policy would lapse after about two months
(the month for which the premium was paid plus, normally, a thirty-day
"grace" period). Thus, the vehicle might be uninsured for ten months of the
year for which the tag was valid.
An even simpler expedient is simply to operate the vehicle without a valid
tag. From the motorist's point of view, this entirely avoids the expense of
insurance (even a single month's premium). As an added bonus to the
motorist-and an added detriment to the state-4he expense of tag renewal is
avoided. This avoidance technique is probably fairly widespread, although, as
noted above, we do not have reliable data.38
2. Traditional Traffic Law Enforcement
It might be argued that the whole tenor of present law indicates consider-
able reluctance to actually force uninsured vehicles off the road. For example,
police officers are directed to impound an uninsured vehicle's license tag, but
not the vehicle itself.39 On the contrary, the statute directs the officer to issue
a temporary sticker, valid for ten days, at the time the tag is impounded.'
In addition, present law may do little to undermine the cost-benefit
analysis that leads many motorists to ignore the mandatory insurance
requirement. For example, while the General Assembly uses mandatory
language in directing the arresting officer to impound the tag of an uninsured
vehicle, issuing a citation for violation of the compulsory insurance statute
appears to be discretionary.41 It is true that fines of at least $50 for a first
37. Insurers can terminate policies that have been in effect for 60 days only for stated
reasons. While nonpayment of premiums accounts for most cancellations, insurers can also
cancel for a variety of reasons that make the insurer's risk significantly greater than it had
realized when it issued the policy. Valid reasons for cancellation include convictions for
serious offenses such as driving while intoxicated and negligent homicide with a vehicle, and
material fraud or misrepresentation in the policy application. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-
303(a)-(b) (Michie 1992). These limitations are inapplicable in the case of nonrenewal, as
distinct from cancellation. See id. at § 23-89-303(d).
38. See Melton, supra note 35.
39. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-104(3)(A) (Michie 1994).
40. See id. at § 27-22-104(d).
41. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-104(c)(1), which states: "[T]he operator shall be issued,
in addition to any traffic citation issued for a violation of this section, a notice of
noncompliance .. " I interpret this language to mandate issuance of the notice, but not of the
citation.
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offense, and much greater penalties for repeat offenders, are contemplated, and
in some instances are "mandatory. 42 These fines are only triggered upon
conviction, however, which presumably will not result merely from the officer
impounding the tag and issuing a temporary sticker. At present, therefore, it
appears possible that the $20 reinstatement fee may be the only sanction for
operating an uninsured vehicle, apart from being required to obtain insurance
to get the tag back. Given that proof of insurance is already required for any
tag renewal, the most probable additional sanction for violation of the
insurance requirements might be viewed as a slap on the wrist.
The most severe sanctions are imposed only if the uninsured vehicle is
involved in an accident. This approach is- understandable, and perhaps
defensible. After all, the only time that the failure to have insurance actually
causes harm is when an accident occurs. On the other hand, this approach can
be condemned as locking the barn after the horse has been stolen. The point
of compulsory insurance is that it be in force before the accident occurs, and
punishing vigorously only after the fact might be viewed as missing the point.
3. Information Gathering
The informational statutes have the effect of requiring insurers to inform
the state of apparent a3 violations of the insurance requirements. The statutes do
not provide for action by the state or consequences to the motorist, and might
therefore appear unimportant. However, by providing the state with informa-
tion not previously available, these new reporting requirements allow us to
consider adoption of enforcement tools that would not have been feasible
earlier.
V. POSSIBLE NEW MEASURES TO INCREASE COMPLIANCE
The starting point in looking for an improved structure should be an
understanding that we will never attain perfect compliance. There are,
however, steps that might be taken-including some that have been taken in
other states-to improve the rate of compliance to some degree. This section
It is possible to read the statutes to remove discretion from the officer. The "in addition
to" language of § 27-22-104(c)(1), when read in conjunction with the mandate for mandatory
fines in § 27-22-103, may manifest a legislative intention that the motorist be fined. I find this
reading strained, because it seems likely that the mandate for imposing a "mandatory" fine is
directed at the judge, not the police officer.
42. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-103(a)-(b)(2) (Michie 1994).
43. One problem with reliance on reports from insurers is that there are legitimate reasons
for a policyholder to terminate coverage. For example, the vehicle may no longer be operable.
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discusses some of these possibilities, attempts to compare their probable
benefits to their probable costs, and attempts to assess their political viability.
A. Requiring Prepayment of a Year's Insurance Premium
The problem of motorists lapsing their policies after renewing their tags
could be addressed by requiring evidence at renewal that the premium had been
prepaid for the entire year. Apart from problems arising from inconsistency in
the state's license tag year and the term of the typical insurance policy," the
principal objection to this approach is that many motorists would find it
burdensome, and some would find it impossible, to pay an entire year's
premium in advance. Imposing substantial burdens on law-abiding motorists
is a significant objection. Moreover, I believe that the General Assembly
would (correctly) anticipate that this approach would create many unhappy
constituents. 45 Thus, I seriously doubt that this proposal could pass the test of
political viability.
Even if it could be adopted, this approach would be of questionable
benefit. It would do nothing to address the problem of motorists simply
driving without either registration or insurance. Indeed, it likely would
increase the number of motorists who take that route. Many vehicle owners
who now maintain insurance year-round pay premiums on a monthly basis. If
faced with the requirement of paying a full year's premium in advance, they
might instead opt against both insurance and registration.
44. Implementation would require changes in the present methods of operation of both
insurance companies and the state. Insurance policies are frequently written for periods of less
than one year; policies of at least one year's duration would be required to implement this
approach. An additional problem is that even a year-long policy would not be sufficient unless
the vehicle's insurance-policy year coincided with the vehicle's license-tag year. This would
probably be workable if the insured owned only one vehicle, but would necessitate changes in
the state's licensing procedures for families owning more than one vehicle. At present, tag
renewal for a given vehicle is in the anniversary month of the owner's first registration of that
particular vehicle; only if the original registration of each vehicle were in the same month
would tag renewal fall in the same month. Thus, if a family owns two or more vehicles, at
present it is not probable that the license tags would expire in the same month. At the same
time, a typical insurance policy normally covers all the vehicles in the household.
If the choice were made to require annual policies paid in advance---a choice that I doubt
seriously the General Assembly is prepared to accept-the problems described in this note
should not prove major barriers to implementation.
45. Research has not revealed any state that imposes this requirement.
[Vol. 21
NONE FOR THE ROAD
B. Letter Informing of Apparent Violation; Suspension or Revocation of
Vehicle Registration and/or of Vehicle Owner's Driver's License
With the new system for reporting of insurance data, the Office of Motor
Vehicle should be able to generate a computerized list of motorists in apparent
violation of the insurance requirements each month.4 However, the new
statute does not mandate or authorize follow-up action by the state. Many
states take action at this stage to encourage compliance and to punish
noncompliance; Arkansas should consider doing so as well.
The initial step could be a certified letter advising the motorist that the
computerized data indicates that the vehicle is not properly insured, and
offering the opportunity to provide proof of insurance or an explanation of why
it is not necessary. Such a letter might spur some motorists to obtain, and to
maintain, insurance. However, the effect will be limited without the credible
threat of more forceful state action in the event the motorist fails to respond.
The letters alone might improve compliance considerably at the outset, but not
after it becomes generally known that nothing will happen to a motorist who
ignores such a letter.
The letters used by many states indicate that the vehicle registration will
be suspended or revoked within a stated period of time.47 If the vehicle's
owner does not surrender the registration or license tag within the stated period,
a number of states suspend the owner's driver's license." And most states that
use enforcement mechanisms such as suspension of license tag and registration
do not allow reinstatement without a financial penalty much higher than the
$20 charged by Arkansas.49
In fact, several provisions along these lines (and more modest than those
in many states) were part of the 1997 legislation in the form initially proposed,
but did not survive to become part of the final act. The bill would have
directed the Office of Motor Vehicle to make a monthly computer comparison
of insurance company reports and registration records, and to send a letter to
the owner of any vehicle that appeared to have been uninsured for three
46. Several states utilize a random audit, which would have made sense in an era of paper.
Given the current capabilities of computers, however, it is difficult to see any advantage of a
random audit in comparison to a monthly review of all vehicles.
47. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-4149 (West 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90
§ 34H; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309.
48. Among the states that suspend the driver's license of an uninsured vehicle's owner are
three of our immediate neighbors. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 303.041; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47
§ 7-605(A); Tx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 601.057, 601.231.
49. While most states enact higher reinstatement penalties than does Arkansas, Kentucky's
may be as low as $15. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.440(12) (Michie 1996). The reinstatement
fee may increase depending on the period of time that the vehicle has been uninsured. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 40-5-71(c)(1)-(2) (1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 303.041 (West 1996).
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consecutive months. The owner then would have had thirty days to present
evidence of a new policy (or new certificate of self-insurance). If he failed to
do so, the Office of Motor Vehicle was to notify the Office of Driver Services
to suspend the driver's license of the owner. Reinstatement would have
required proof of current insurance.5 °
Even if the General Assembly were now willing to adopt provisions along
these lines, the problem of motorists simply deciding not to register their
vehicles would be exacerbated. That limitation significantly reduces the
attractiveness of this approach.
C. Changing Tags Annually
As we have seen above, a serious flaw of several approaches is that they
can be defeated by a motorist who is willing to drive an unregistered vehicle.
One reason that many motorists may be willing to operate their vehicles
without current registration is that the evidence of their failure is relatively
discreet. The tag does not change from year to year, only the small sticker
indicating the year of expiration.
Perhaps the state should change license tags, rather than stickers, each
year, and should make each year's tag look distinctive. For example, tags
expiring in 2000 might be predominantly red, those in 2001 predominantly
yellow, those in 2002 predominantly blue, etc. Violations would be obvious
to police, which might encourage more motorists to obtain registration. This,
in turn, would make it more likely that the state could utilize some of the tools
described above without causing many motorists to forego registration.
Unfortunately, the costs of changing tags each year may be significant,
and may well outweigh the prospective benefit. I suspect that the least of these
costs would be the expense of producing the tags. Transporting, storing, and
mailing the tags would be much more expensive than for the stickers currently
in use.
More important, a choice would have to be made concerning whether the
vehicle would be given the same number each year, or a new tag number with
a new tag. If the tag number had to follow the vehicle, the state and the
motorist would have the expense, delay, and bother of getting this year's
yellow ABC123 to the holder of last year's red ABC123. This might prove
50. See Ark. H.B. 81-1156, § 4. The other significant enforcement provision that did not
become part of the final act was a provision that made the failure to maintain proof of insurance
in the vehicle at all times a violation. If a subsequent investigation revealed that the vehicle had
in fact been insured, the motorist would be excused of the more serious offense of failure to
maintain insurance, but still would be subject to a fine of $25 for failure to have carried the
proof of insurance in the vehicle. See id. § 1.
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especially burdensome for the large number of persons who move during a
given year. The alternative would be that a new tag number would go with the
new tag each year. That might make effective enforcement of certain
violations more difficult. For example, a scofflaw with a large number of
unpaid parking tickets would probably be harder to detect.5
VI. DOES COMPULSORY INSURANCE REALLY ENJOY PUBLIC SUPPORT?
The reader will observe that several approaches discussed above are
unlikely to find sufficient political support to win enactment in the General
Assembly-a reflection of public ambivalence. But the truth is that present
laws are strong enough to raise the level of compliance significantly if law
enforcement agencies enforced them vigorously. In addition to the usual
problems of prioritizing scarce resources, I suspect that lax enforcement arises
from the belief, which I share, that the public would not support vigorous
enforcement. Public support is of particular import to sheriffs who must be
reelected.52 But public support for the law and its enforcement is a legitimate
concern for any law enforcement official at any level, or should be. People
support law enforcement much more enthusiastically when it is directed against
"real criminals" than when it targets generally law abiding citizens. This may
explain why the FBI is more popular than the IRS.
The public recognizes that certain traffic offenses are sufficiently
dangerous to merit serious enforcement. After decades of public ambivalence,
driving under the influence of alcohol is now in this category. Getting drunk
drivers off the road has become a cause that will not threaten a sheriff's
reelection or undermine public support for the law.
Driving without insurance does not evoke the same level of public
concern. The issue here is not public safety, but "merely" money. The primary
reason that people drive without insurance is that they feel they cannot afford
it. Unlike drunk drivers, vehicles and their drivers do not become more
dangerous because they lack insurance.
I do not believe that the Arkansas public would support vigorous
measures to clear the roads of uninsured vehicles. This, rather than the
statutory framework, is the primary stumbling block. Present law calls not only
51. Operation of private businesses might also be affected. For example, many private
parking lots operate without attendants, depending upon patrons to put money in a slot. Despite
threats, these lots are unlikely to tow a vehicle whose driver did not deposit money in advance,
at least for the first such failure. Changing tag numbers would make it harder for the operator
to identify vehicles whose drivers repeatedly fail to pay.
52. Considerable involvement by law enforcement personnel will be necessary to any
effective program, and these must be primarily municipal and county officials. There are not
enough state police to effectively enforce traffic laws alone.
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for fines, 3 but for a one-year jail term;54 lack of public support, and thus lack
of enforcement (by judges and prosecutors as well as police officers), renders
this potentially strong deterrent almost a dead letter.
VII. ALTERNATIVES TO COMPULSORY INSURANCE
If the public does not support strong enforcement of compulsory
insurance, we should carefully examine the possibility that the public is right.
If so-and I believe that a strong case can be made--the implications are far-
reaching. They may call into question not merely enforcement policies, but the
concept of compulsory insurance, and even the liability system governing
automobile accidents.
A. Optional Insurance (De Jure or De Facto)
The case against mandatory insurance can be supported on various bases.
1. Fairness and Efficiency
The wisdom or fairness of laws restricting use of taxpayer-financed roads
to those able to pay for insurance, or otherwise demonstrate their ability to
respond in damages, is not self-evident. People are not generally required by
law to carry insurance covering routine activities of daily life, notwithstanding
the fact that many such activities can result in harm to others. Whether driving
an automobile should be singled out in this fashion is a policy question of
import. Certainly it is not irrational to do so, because driving--an activity
undertaken by most Arkansas adults every day"--leads to more injuries to
unrelated third parties than does any other activity. On the other hand, the law
does not require insurance as a precondition to engage in activities that are
much more dangerous to unrelated persons than is driving. For example, an
hour of hunting surely poses much greater danger to others than does an hour
of driving.
53. See supra text accompanying note 23.
54. This penalty is possible upon a third conviction. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-
103(b)(2) (Michie 1994).
55. The number of vehicles registered in Arkansas is very close to the state's adult
population. (Of course, some vehicles are driven primarily by persons under age 18.) At
present, there are approximately 1.9 million vehicles registered in Arkansas. Telephone
Interview with Donald R. Melton, Liaison to the Governor for Local Government, Law
Enforcement, and Transportation (Oct. 16, 1998). Arkansas' total population in 1996 amounted
to just over 2.5 million, of which 1.85 million was aged 18 or over. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, tbl. 33, at 33 (117th ed. 1997).
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Moreover, unlike hunting, driving has enormous social value. 6 Driving
is not a sport or a luxury, but for most people an essential requirement for
living a normal life. Most driving is purposeful; relatively little driving is
simple joyriding. Most Arkansas cities lack bus service; many towns and rural
areas lack even taxis. Routine and important activities such as going to work
and buying groceries would become much more burdensome for most
Arkansans if they could not drive. Cracking down on uninsured drivers could
even complicate the state's effort to move welfare recipients into the work
force.
Requiring insurance is very different from using law to keep dangerous
drivers or vehicles off the road. In the case of insurance, the limitation is based
primarily on economics, not safety. 7
Furthermore, what is the realistic effect of 25-50-15 coverage? It provides
ample coverage for relatively minor accidents--admittedly, the majority-but
abysmally inadequate coverage for severely injured accident victims. Even if
every motorist in the state complied with the compulsory insurance laws, an
adequate recovery for a seriously injured accident victim would still depend
upon being injured by a tortfeasor with assets or insurance limits considerably
higher than $25,000.
2. The Role of First-Party Insurance
Recovery from a third-party tortfeasor, or the tortfeasor's insurance
company, is not the only route open to the innocent victim. Motorists may
choose to insure themselves against both property damage and personal injury
by purchasing first-party insurance; many, probably most, already have such
coverage. Collision insurance provides protection against accidental damage
to a vehicle on a no-fault basis--that is, regardless of whether the damage
occurred without negligence, due to the negligence of the insured, due to the
negligence of another, or due to a combination of negligence of the insured and
another. Thus, apart from the deductible," collision insurance protects against
property damage caused by an uninsured tortfeasor.
56. Whether there is any net social value in killing innocent animals for sport is open to
debate.
57. There is a relationship between danger and uninsured vehicles and drivers. Drivers
with bad driving records are more likely than the average driver to cause accidents in the future.
This correlates to safety, and also to high insurance premiums. It is reasonable to assume that
individuals facing high premiums--4.e., unsafe drivers--are more likely to forego coverage.
58. Collision insurance is subject to a deductible, generally ranging from $50 to $1,000.
Thus, collision insurance does not provide complete protection to the insured. The insured
would be entitled to recover the deductible amount from a tortfeasor.
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In the case of personal injury, the General Assembly requires, as a general
rule, that any automobile insurance policy include no-fault, first-party coverage
for limited medical, income continuation, and death benefits.5 9 In keeping with
the general rule that first-party insurance is voluntary, however, the insured
may waive this coverage.60
The most relevant optional policy provision goes directly to the problem
of being harmed by the negligence of an uninsured motorist. Unless rejected
in writing,6' every policy must include first-party "protection of persons
insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or
operators of uninsured motor vehicles" for bodily injury or death.62
Individuals may also protect themselves against the possibility of severe
injury at the hands of a motorist who has complied with the legal requirements
of 25-50-15 liability coverage. Because $25,000 is likely to be inadequate in
the case of serious injury, many motorists purchase first-party underinsured
motorist coverage. The concept is similar to that of uninsured motorist
coverage, in that it depends on the legal liability of "the other" driver.63 Like
other first-party insurance, underinsured motorist coverage is optional.'
First-party insurance unrelated to vehicles can also come into play. For
example, benefits from health, life, and disability insurance may be triggered
by an accident occasioned by the negligence of an uninsured motorist.
What is the relevance of these various types of first-party insurance to the
argument that third-party liability insurance should not be required? The fact
that these forms of insurance are routinely available and widely purchased
means that a law-abiding motorist65 will not fail to obtain compensation for
59. Medical benefits (including funeral expenses) are covered up to $5,000 per person.
Income continuation is for 70 percent of earnings, up to a maximum of $140 per week, from
the period beginning eight weeks after the accident and ending not more than 52 weeks after
the accident. The accidental death benefit is $5,000. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-202
(Michie 1992).
60. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-203 (Michie Supp. 1997).
61. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-403(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 1997).
62. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-403(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1997). The statute does not
mandate that uninsured motorist coverage extend to property damage. However, collision
insurance, which covers property damage regardless of cause, is normally available. See supra
note 58 and accompanying text.
63. Coverage is triggered by the insured's entitlement to "damages for bodily injuries to
or death of an insured which the insured is legally entitled from the owner or operator of
another motor vehicle whenever the liability insurance limits of such other owner or operator
are less than the amount of damages incurred by the insured." See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-
209(a)(3) (Michie Supp. 1997).
64. As with uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage is mandatory
unless waived by the insured. See id. at § 23-89-209(a)(1).
65. Insurance is not so likely to be held by victims other than motorists and their
passengers--pedestrians, bicyclists, etc. Certainly they will not be protected by uninsured
motorist coverage; they may or may not have broader forms of first-party insurance, such as
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harm caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist unless he chooses' not
to purchase insurance to protect against this well recognized danger.
This is not to argue that the unlawful failure to maintain third-party
insurance does not affect law-abiding motorists. Clearly, it affects them
adversely by placing them in a dilemma of risk or expense. They can decline
to purchase insurance to protect themselves from the negligence of an
uninsured driver, in which case (if we make the reasonable assumption that the
uninsured driver is judgment proof) their loss will be uncompensated.
Alternatively, they may pay a premium that reflects the cost of protecting
others against the consequences of their own negligence and the cost of
protecting themselves against the negligence of others.67
What can be said, however, is that the stakes are purely economic, and
that the people likely to be injured by uninsured motorists have the option to
protect themselves at relatively modest cost. It can be argued that that
additional expense does not justify barring motorists from the public highways
for reasons unrelated to safety. (Safety is another thing altogether. Society has
a significant interest in keeping drunk drivers off the road even if they are fully
insured. Insurance proceeds never fully offset the consequences of an
accident.)
3. Acknowledge Defeat?
The preceding discussion suggests that an appropriate societal response
to the problem of uninsured motorists may be a realization that we are not
willing to do what is necessary to attain very high compliance rates, because
health, disability, and life insurance.
If a vehicle is covered for the no-fault benefits described above (see supra note 59), those
benefits extend to "occupants of the insured vehicle and to persons struck by the insured
vehicle, including pedestrians, bicyclists, motorcyclists, persons in a horse-drawn wagon or cart,
and persons riding on an animal, and to none other." ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-204(a) (Michie
1992). The coverage is secondary to any coverage the person struck may have under another
policy. See id. at § 23-89-204(b).
66. "Chooses" is a fair word because motorists who never give the matter conscious
thought will be covered. All these forms of first-party insurance are purchased by large
numbers of individuals, and, in several instances discussed above, will automatically be
included in a motorist's own liability insurance policy unless the motorist expressly informs the
insurance company to delete the coverage.
67. This dilemma is present in decisions about purchasing first-party options on
automobile insurance, such as collision and uninsured motorist coverage. In the case of broader
first-party insurance, by contrast, the possibility of injury at the hands of a negligent, uninsured,
and judgment-proof motorist is unlikely to be a factor. People do not buy life, health, or
disability policies based on the fear of injury at the hands of an uninsured motorist. Nor will




the cure may be worse than the disease. We then would have two obvious
options. We could continue our present laws and enforcement policies,
realizing that tens of thousands will continue to disobey the law. Alternatively,
we could repeal the mandatory insurance provisions, and leave insurance
decisions to the market.
Neither route is entirely satisfying. Continuing present practice rewards
those who disregard the law, while shifting the additional expense to those who
follow it. Outright repeal, on the other hand, while not fostering disrespect for
the law or rewarding lawbreakers, would swell the ranks of the uninsured.
That development, in turn, would considerably increase the expense of
uninsured motorist coverage.
B. Curtailment of the Tort System for Most Traffic Accidents
In my view, the most satisfactory approach to the problem would require
fundamentally changing the tort system relative to vehicle accidents involving
automobiles, vans, and small trucks.6" Many of the problems of uninsured
motorists would be resolved if we were willing to abandon the fault system for
allocating losses in most traffic accident cases. Moving to a system of no-fault
is too important a decision to be made on the basis of the problem of uninsured
motorists. Moreover, this article, which is devoted to the very different
problem of uninsured vehicles, is not the proper place for an extended
discussion of no-fault. However, having concluded that adoption of no-fault
would provide the best resolution of the problem of uninsured vehicles, I think
that a brief discussion of no-fault is warranted.
Arkansas law currently provides for what is sometimes called no-fault
insurance 69-- the payments for medical, income continuation, and accidental
death benefits discussed above.7° However, it is a misconception to think that
Arkansas has adopted a no-fault system merely because these additional first-
party benefits can be purchased as part of an automobile liability policy. These
are benefits routinely available in health, disability, and life policies, except
68. Big trucks constitute a significant separate risk category, which might justify their
continued tort liability. Generally, vehicles and drivers pose reciprocal risks to each other; A
endangers B while B endangers A. Big trucks pose a nonreciprocal risk. In a case of a collision
between a big truck and an automobile, it is clear who the loser will be. Moreover, big trucks
are commercial vehicles, so it is likely that assets or liability insurance is available to protect
victims.
The no-fault provisions discussed here would require significant modification in the case
of injuries to persons other than drivers and passengers of motor vehicles (mostly pedestrians).
69. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Smith, 263 Ark. 849, 568 S.W.2d 11, 13-14 (1978).
70. See supra note 59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the insurance policy
provisions contemplated by ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-202.
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without the limitation that the injury must occur in a traffic accident. The
statutory scheme retains fault-based tort liability,7' coupled with the insurer's
right to subrogation with respect for no-fault benefits paid.
72
Under present Arkansas law, therefore, the ultimate economic effect of an
injury caused by a negligent driver is supposed to be borne by that driver. If
the victim has waived the optional no-fault coverage, full payment is to be
made to the victim; if the victim has received no-fault benefits, then to the
victim's insurer to the extent of such benefits, and any additional damages to
the victim. Under this arrangement, if the tortfeasor is uninsured and judgment
proof--the problem addressed by this article-the victim does not receive the
compensation contemplated by law. Even if the victim receives the limited no-
fault benefits, it is only because the victim has paid premiums inflated by the
insurer's knowledge that it may be unable to exercise its subrogation rights.
Commentators describe Arkansas and other states with such legal
arrangements "add-on" jurisdictions, because the no-fault benefits are in
addition to, and not in lieu of,73 fault-based tort recoveries. States that have
adopted a purer form of no-fault have ended liability for negligence in most
traffic accidents.74 Using this terminology, approximately thirteen states have
in effect some version of the purer form of no-fault.75 Here, I am discussing
this purer form.
Under a truly pure no-fault system, each party would look exclusively to
his own insurance coverage for compensation. Society could continue to
protect itself from unsafe drivers through the criminal law and the efforts of
law enforcement personnel, which should enjoy relatively high public
support.76 Insurance would serve the function of compensating injured
71. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-206 (Michie 1992).
72. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-207(a) (Michie 1992). The insurer bears a share of the
cost of recovery proportionate to its share of the total recovery. See id. at § 23-89-207(b).
73. That the no-fault benefits displace tort recovery is crucial to a true no-fault system:
"The most distinctive feature of no-fault plans, and the most significant as well, is the partial
tort exemption." Robert E. Keeton, Compensation Systems and Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973
UTAH L. REv. 383, 397.
74. See Jeffrey O'Connell et al., The Comparative Costs ofAllowing Consumer Choice
forAuto Insurance in All Fify States, 55 MD. L. REv. 160, 161 n. 4 (1996); ROBERT H. JOOST,
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAw 2d § 5.1, at 1 & § 5.9, at 19 (1992).
75. See O'Connell, supra note 74, app. C, listing fifteen states; JOOST, supra note 74, at
2, § 6:1, lists fourteen states. Both include Connecticut, which apparently has recently repealed
no-fault. See Mark M. Hager, No-Fault Drives Again: A Contemporary Primer, 52 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 793, 793 (1998). Professor Hager, incidentally, apparently uses a more inclusive
definition of no-fault than that of other authorities, because he states that 26 states "have some
sort of auto no-fault." Id.
76. Whatever police and prosecutorial resources are currently devoted to enforcement of
mandatory insurance laws could be employed in enforcement of other laws that are more
important to the public.
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parties-all injured parties, not merely those injured by the fault of another.
Payments would be determined based on the severity of injury, up to policy
limits. Fault would be irrelevant in determining compensation, although a
driver's record would be relevant in setting premiums 77 the threat of higher
premiums may create a deterrent to unsafe driving comparable to that of the
tort system.78
No American 79 jurisdiction has ever adopted pure no-fault.8" For example,
the American statutory schemes "ban pain and suffering claims for minor
injuries, but allow them for major ones. All allow suits for death and egregious
injury. They differ in how minor an injury can be and still be major enough for
lawsuit eligibility."'"
No-fault insurance is first-party insurance. In theory, the state could leave
decisions about its purchase to individual choice, as is the norm for first-party
insurance. It is likely, however, that the public would be offended by a
significant number of uncompensated innocent victims of negligent drivers
who, even if able to pay, would not be held civilly responsible. In part for this
reason, no-fault is usually mandatory, notwithstanding academic criticism.82
77. "Premium-setting based on the number and severity of accidents... makes as much
sense under no-fault as it does under tort." Hager, supra note 75, at 799. The idea that high-
risk drivers would not pay anything for their poor driving habits has been disputed by
proponents of no-fault for decades. See Robert E. Keeton, Basic Protection and the Future of
Negligence Law, 3 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1968).
78. Professor Hager thinks that both the tort system and no-fault are destined to fail in
deterring the worst drivers:
Young males and the inebriated, the two chief classes of deviantly bad drivers, are
not likely to respond to tort liability with safer driving, because their dangerous
behavior stems from impaired judgment from the start .... For these drivers, under
either no-fault or tort, meaningful deterrence can arise only if they risk forfeiture of
driving privileges or other harsh sanctions, even if they have not yet caused an
accident.
Hager, supra note 75, at 800-01.
79. New Zealand, Israel, Sweden, Finland, and three Canadian provinces have pure no-
fault automobile insurance. JOOST, supra note 74, at 3, § 7:1. The broadest no-fault system
ever placed into effect is the New Zealand Accident Compensation Act. Under this sweeping
act, "everyone injured in any type of accident in New Zealand, irrespective of the cause, will
be entitled to claim compensation from the new Accident Compensation Commission." D.R.
Harris, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: A Comprehensive Insurance System, 37 MOD.
L. REV. 361, 362 (1974). At the same time, "no claim, either at common law or under a statute,
may be brought for damages arising out of personal injury or death suffered by accident in New
Zealand." Id. at 363.
80. See Hager, supra note 75, at 804.
81. Hager, supra note 75, at 805.
82. Professor Epstein has argued: "I have a strong preference for voluntary markets....
It may well be that the case is made for the abolition of all tort liability, but it does not follow
that those same arguments require instituting compulsory first party insurance." Richard A.
Epstein, Automobile No-Fault Plans: A Second Look at First Principles, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV.
769, 789-90 (1979-80).
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If Arkansas were to adopt mandatory no-fault insurance, of course, tens
of thousands would disregard this requirement, just as, at present, they
disregard the statute requiring third-party liability insurance. However, the
consequences of noncompliance would be squarely placed on the person who
violated the law, and not on the victim of his negligence: If you buy insurance,
you receive compensation in case of injury; if you disregard the requirement,
you do not. One of the incongruities of current law is that an uninsured
motorist does not protect others against the consequences of his own negli-
gence, but is able to recover damages from an insured motorist who is at fault.8 3
The virtues of no-fault have been sung in the academic literature for the
past three decades," and need not be discussed in detail here. A signal
advantage is the reduction in disputes and litigation, with their attendant
expense, delay, uncertainty, error, inconvenience, and hard feelings. Most
obviously, no-fault would end most legal disputes about whose negligence
caused the accident.85 Even in those cases where fault is clear, arguments
concerning damages would be significantly reduced. A claimant can more
easily work to a resolution with his own insurance company, with which there
is a preexisting and continuing relationship, than with the other driver's
liability insurance company, which has little reason to try to satisfy the
claimant.
More important than these improvements is the different philosophy that
no-fault embodies-injured people need compensation whether or not their
injury occurred as the result of another's negligence. This is an extension of
the workers' compensation idea, which I have advocated in other contexts.8 6
Having evaluated other proposals in terms of political reality, I should do
the same with no-fault. I think it is extremely unlikely that the Arkansas
General Assembly will adopt no-fault within the foreseeable future.8 7 No state
83. To the degree a state's no-fault system deviates from pure no-fault, the problem of
uninsured motorists continues. For example, if the law preserves a tort action for wrongful
death, that right continues to be worthless if the tortfeasor is uninsured and judgment proof.
Even in that case, the victim would receive the no-fault benefits, which would be at least as
much as minimum liability coverage under present law. Under any system, it is hard to obtain
full recovery for serious injury unless the tortfeasor is deep-pocketed.
84. For a summary of the claimed advantages of no-fault, see Hager, supra note 75, at
807-08.
85. Because most no-fault plans allow tort actions for certain serious injuries, some legal
disputes concerning fault would continue.
86. See Philip D. Oliver, Once Is Enough: A Proposed Bar of the Injured Employee's
Cause ofAction Against a Third Party, 58 FoRDHAM L. REv. 117 (1989).
87. If no-fault is to come to Arkansas within the foreseeable future, it is most likely to
come as the result of federal legislation. See Hager, supra note 75, at 818-19; see also Philip
Buchan, 'Not-Ready-for-Prime-Time' No-Fault, 34 TRIAL, July 1998, at 11.
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has done so for over twenty years.88 The opposition of the bar alone would
doom such a change, and others would find abandonment of the fault system
objectionable.8 9
VIII. CONCLUSION
If there is a politically viable solution to the problem of uninsured
motorists in Arkansas, I have not thought of it, nor have I found it in the laws
of other states or in academic literature. Any measure strong enough to make
a significant dent in the problem is likely to create a new problem of equal or
greater severity. For that reason, any such proposal is likely to lack political
and public support. I believe that the public is not willing to force large
numbers of people off the road on economic grounds, and I regard the public's
view as reasonable.
Although a satisfactory solution to the problem is unattainable (assuming
continuation of third-party liability and compulsory insurance), we may be able
to achieve a modest increase in the percentage of vehicles that are lawfully
insured. Compiling a monthly list of registered vehicles that apparently lack
insurance, and sending registered letters to their owners, may have some effect.
The impact of this measure will be greater if the letter conveys a credible threat
of significant consequences for the motorist who does not respond. It must be
recognized that any measure tied to vehicle registration will tend to increase the
number of motorists who do not register (or insure) their vehicles. The most
promising measure to combat the problem of nonregistration may be issuing
tags of different colors each year, rather than merely giving motorists stickers
to attach to the old tags. While the cost and inconvenience of this measure
would be considerable, it may nonetheless be worthwhile.
In my view, the best approach would entail adoption of a no-fault tort
system to govern most traffic accidents. No-fault would offer significant
advantages, of which reasonably satisfactory resolution of the problem of
uninsured motorists would be one. The Arkansas General Assembly is,
however, unlikely to adopt no-fault within the foreseeable future.
88. See Hager, supra note 75, at 793.
89. One no-fault opponent. an associate director of ATLA Public Affairs, dismisses the
idea that no-fault has been thwarted by "the political clout of the trial lawyers.... It apparently
has not occurred to them [proponents of no-fault] that, possibly, no-fault has failed because
most people disagree with allowing those who cause injuries to buy immunity from liability."
Buchan, supra note 87, at 11. Of course, it might be argued that the basic idea behind third-
party liability insurance-which I doubt Mr. Buchan opposes-is to allow people to buy
immunity from liability.
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